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Recent years have witnessed an emergence of a novel specialty in social epistemology: 
the social epistemology of research groups. Within this specialty there are two 
approaches to understanding the epistemic structure of scientific collaboration. Some 
philosophers suggest that scientific knowledge emerging in collaborations includes 
collective beliefs or acceptances (Andersen 2010; Bouvier 2004; Cheon 2013; Gilbert 
2000; Rolin 2010; Staley 2007; Wray 2006, 2007). Some others suggest that the 
epistemic structure of scientific collaboration is based on relations of trust among 
scientists (Andersen and Wagenknecht 2013; Fagan 2011, 2012; Frost-Arnold 2013; 
Hardwig 1991; Kusch 2002; de Ridder 2013; Thagard 2010; Wagenknecht 2013). In the 
former case, a research team is thought to arrive at a group view which is not fully 
reducible to individual views. In the latter case, each team member is thought to rely on 
testimonial knowledge which is based on her trusting other team members. These two 
models are not exclusive and competing accounts of the epistemic structure of scientific 
collaboration. They can be seen as two parallel models for understanding the special 
nature of scientific knowledge produced in collaborations. Sometimes scientific 
knowledge in collaborations takes the form of collective acceptance, sometimes it is an 
outcome of trust-based acceptance, and at other times it takes some other form. 
 
In “Facing the Incompleteness of Epistemic Trust: Managing Dependence in Scientific 
Practice” (2014) Susann Wagenknecht makes an important contribution to the debate on 
the role of trust in scientific collaboration. On the basis of her empirical study of two 
research groups she revises John Hardwig’s influential account of epistemic trust in two 
ways. First, while Hardwig assumes that epistemic trust is “blind” in the sense that a 
testifier’s trustworthiness is taken for granted at least partially (1991, 693), Wagenknecht 
argues that epistemic trust among collaborating scientists is not blind (2014, 1). In the 
actual practice of science scientists seek some kind of empirical warrant to ground their 
trust in their collaborators (5). Second, while Hardwig assumes that in the absence of 
first-hand evidence trust can rationally ground belief in testimony (1991, 699), 
Wagenknecht argues that trust is not sufficient to “manage epistemic dependency” in 
research teams (2014, 2). She argues that trust is rarely a stand-alone reason to believe 
that p. Insofar as trust is a reason to believe that p it is accompanied by a range of other 
reasons such as some first-hand evidence to believe that p, considerations of coherence, 
and reasons to believe that scientific institutions and practices are reliable (4-5).  
 
In this response paper I aim to do three things. First, I wish to clarify the claim that 
epistemic trust is incomplete and I suggest that there is one dimension to the 
incompleteness not mentioned by Wagenknecht. Second, I argue that moral trust can play 
an important role in managing epistemic dependency under conditions of incomplete 
epistemic trust. By moral trust I mean trust in the moral character of the testifier (see also 
Frost-Arnold 2013). Finally, I raise some questions for future research. 
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What Does It Mean To Say That Epistemic Trust Is Incomplete? 
 
There are four claims implicit in the view that epistemic trust is incomplete. One claim is 
that epistemic trust is not blind in the sense that the trustworthiness of the testifier is 
taken for granted. As Wagenknecht explains, epistemic trust in collaborative scientific 
practice requires an empirical warrant even though the warrant can only be limited 
(Wagenknecht 2014, 5). Another claim implicit in the view that trust is incomplete is that 
trust does not always function as a default assumption in relations among collaborating 
scientists. “Trust is a delicate plant, and it grows slowly” (7). The second claim can be 
understood as a corollary to the first claim. If a scientist needs to have empirical evidence 
to support trust in a collaborator and the empirical evidence needed is typically first-hand 
personal experience of collaboration, then trust needs time to grow.  
 
The third claim implicit in the view that trust is incomplete is that personal trust in the 
testifier is supplemented with strategies for indirect monitoring. Such strategies can 
include checking the coherence of testimony against background information or seeking 
for a second opinion on the subject matter of testimony. As Wagenknecht explains, 
monitoring enables scientists to work around personal trust (11). Scientists can also 
supplement personal trust with impersonal trust, that is, trust in institutions and practices 
such as gate keeping, peer review, and replication of experiments (11). Yet, Wagenknecht 
emphasizes that both personal and impersonal trust are incomplete (17).  
 
The fourth claim implicit in the view that trust is incomplete is that trust is future-
oriented. To trust someone means that one makes assumptions about future events and 
since one cannot have any empirical evidence of future events, trust is necessarily 
underdetermined by the evidence. In other words, one hopes that others will turn out to 
be worthy of the trust one has invested in them (10).  
 
While I agree with Wagenknecht that trust is incomplete in the four ways outlined in this 
section, I would argue that there is yet another dimension to the incompleteness of 
epistemic trust. Trust is incomplete because it involves a moral dimension. I would argue 
also that it is the moral dimension that enables scientists to cope with the incompleteness 
of epistemic trust. Let me explain the argument in more detail. 
 
The Default Assumption of Honesty 
 
As Hardwig argues, trust in a testifier involves trust in the testifier’s moral and epistemic 
character (1991, 700). When a scientist trusts a testifier, she trusts that the testifier is 
honest in giving her testimony and competent in the relevant domain. Whereas honesty is 
a moral virtue, competence and some other virtues such as conscientiousness and 
capability of epistemic self-assessment are epistemic virtues (700). It is not difficult to 
see why the two dimensions are implicit in trustworthiness. The moral and epistemic 
virtues are meant to guard against different sources of error. The moral virtue of honesty 
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is meant to protect the integrity of scientific knowledge against a temptation to falsify or 
fabricate data (or in some other way to intentionally distort the research process). The 
epistemic virtues are meant to function as antidotes to incompetence, lack of experience, 
carelessness, or some other sources of error. Even an honest inquirer may stumble into 
the latter types of error when she does not have a realistic picture of her expertise and 
skills. 
 
I would argue that there is an asymmetry between the epistemic and the moral dimensions 
of trustworthiness. While scientists may expect to have some empirical warrant to 
support their trust in the epistemic character of their collaborator, the moral character of 
the collaborator is to a large extent taken for granted. This is because evidence of moral 
character is necessarily incomplete. For example, when group leaders recruit scientists 
into their teams, they may seek evidence of the moral character of the candidate in letters 
of recommendation. Also, when scientists work in relatively small and stable teams, they 
are likely to trust the moral character of other team members because an extended 
experience of collaboration gives them a reason to do so. But even when there is evidence 
of good moral character, trust in the moral character of other team members is 
underdetermined by evidence. This is because the very notion of character refers to a 
disposition to behave in certain ways across a range of social situations. Consequently, 
trust in the moral character of other scientists is at least partly based on a principle of 
charity.  
 
I would argue that moral trust is one way to manage epistemic dependency in research 
groups even if it is the case that the trust in the moral character of the collaborator is 
based on incomplete evidence. This is because honesty is often treated as a default 
assumption in scientific collaboration. To say that honesty is a default assumption means 
that the collaborator is assumed to be honest unless one has a reason to doubt it. Having 
made a mistake is not yet a reason to doubt a scientist’s honesty since many mistakes are 
due to oversight, lack of know-how, or some other shortcoming in the scientist’s 
epistemic character. One has a reason to doubt someone’s honesty when there is evidence 
of intentional attempts to distort research process (or of gross negligence leading to such 
distortions). Honesty is treated as a default assumption, and rightly so, because it is a 
moral value judgment rather than an empirical judgment. It is a moral value judgment 
because it is accepted for a moral reason. The moral reason is the belief that it is morally 
wrong to doubt another group member’s honesty when one does not have a reason to do 
so.  
 
Questions for Future Research 
 
In this response paper I have argued that trust in the moral character of the collaborator is 
different from trust in the collaborator’s epistemic character. The right thing to do is to 
treat good moral character as a default assumption. This is not necessarily the case for the 
epistemic character of the collaborator. Scientists are right to look for some empirical 
evidence to support their trust in the competence of their collaborators. This conclusion is 
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consistent with Wagenknecht’s findings. As she explains, scientists use many strategies 
to monitor the competence of their collaborators (2014, 21). For example, they are 
engaged in question-and-answer type of interactions and sometimes they witness the 
work of their collaborators in order to increase their understanding of others’ expertise. 
Yet, trust plays a role in scientific collaborations because other group members do not 
know the details as well as the person who is in charge of running an experiment (11-13).  
 
The claim that there is an asymmetry between the moral and the epistemic dimensions of 
trustworthiness gives rise to questions for future research. While it seems to make sense 
to distinguish among the moral and epistemic dimensions analytically, as Hardwig does, 
can we distinguish them also in the actual practice of science? Also, are the moral and 
the epistemic dimensions interconnected in ways which need to be revealed in future 
research? 
 
Contact details: kristina.rolin@helsinki.fi 
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